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Abstract This paper extends the pre-bid R&D and auctions design literature to an
independent private value setting where each bidder incurs a private-information valuation
discovery cost upon entry. The seller commits to a mechanism before the bidders’ entry
decisions. The main findings are as follows. Firstly, a second-price auction with no
entry fee and a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation is ex ante efficient. Secondly,
a second price auction with the same reserve price and appropriate ex ante entry fees
is revenue-maximizing. Every bidder’s ex ante entry fee equals the hazard rate of his
entry cost distribution, evaluated at the desired entry-threshold for him. Thirdly, the
revenue-maximizing entry differs from the ex ante efficient entry. Fourthly, even for the
symmetric setting, the ex ante efficient/revenue-maximizing entry could be asymmetric.
Lastly, for the symmetric setting, when the cumulative distribution function of the entry
costs changes rather slowly with respect to its argument, the efficient entry must be
symmetric across bidders and it is the unique entry equilibrium of the efficient auction. If
the hazard rate of the entry cost distribution is additionally increasing, then the revenue-
maximizing entry must also be symmetric and it is the unique entry equilibrium of the
revenue-maximizing auction. These results mean that large dispersion in the entry costs
restores the symmetry in the efficient/revenue-maximizing entry.
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JEL classifications: D44, D82.
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1 Introduction
The impact of valuation discovery costs on bidders’ entry decisions and auctions design,
has been extensively studied in the pre-bid R&D and auctions design literature. In this
paper, valuation discovery costs refer to the costs for bidders to discover their valuations
of the auctioned object.1 Milgrom (1981), French and McCormick (1984), McAfee and
McMillan (1987), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987, 1993), Harstad (1990), Levin and Smith
(1994), Ye (2004) and Lu (2006) among others study the case where bidders’ valuation
discovery costs are fixed. Matthews (1984), Tan (1992), Bag (1997), Persico (2000) and
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) consider the case where the information quality depends
on the bidders’ investment. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2005) present a thorough review
of the literature.
Examples abound however where the bidders’ costs on the pre-bid R&D activities
such as acquiring and analyzing information are their private knowledge. Piccione and
Tan (1996) pointed out that several aspects of the pre-bid R&D process in the Outer
Continental Shelf wildcat auctions are private knowledge of an individual bidder. In
many procurements of research or construction projects, the bidders have to spend huge
amount of resources to estimate their own costs of finishing the project through various
pre-bid R&D activities, such as examining the specific requirements of the buyer and
investigating local geological conditions, etc. The valuation discovery costs could be the
bidders’ business secret and these costs could vary significantly across bidders because the
levels of their pre-bid R&D activities and/or their efficiency in carrying out these activities
can be very different. In this paper, we study a setting where the valuation discovery costs
are bidders’ private information, and derive the auctions that maximize the expected total
1Many other studies focus on entry costs that are incurred by bidders who know their valuations. These
studies include Green and Laffont (1984), Samuelson (1985), Stegeman (1996), Menezes and Monteiro
(2000), Lu (2004), Celik and Yilankaya (2005) and Tan and Yilankaya (forthcoming).
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surplus and seller’s expected revenue, respectively.2 A general independent private value
(IPV) framework allowing asymmetry across bidders is adopted in this study. The seller
commits to a mechanism before the bidders’ entry decisions.
We first establish useful connections between the first order conditions that character-
izes the desired entry thresholds of entry costs and the expected payoff of these threshold
types in a second-price auction with no entry fee and a reserve price equal to seller’s valu-
ation. These connections show that the above mentioned auction is ex ante efficient, but
it is not revenue-maximizing. Instead, a second price auction with the same reserve price
and appropriate ex ante entry fees is revenue-maximizing. These entry fees are positive
and extract all the expected surplus of the entrants of the threshold types. Specifically,
these entry fees equal the hazard rates of the bidders’ entry cost distributions evaluated
at the bidders’ entry thresholds. Our findings confirm and generalize the insights from the
existing literature. In a private value setting where bidders’ information quality depends
on their investment, Bag (1997) shows that a sealed-bid second-price auction with ex ante
entry fees uniquely implements the first-best outcome and is optimal to the seller. In a
more general setting, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) further show that the Vickrey-
Clark-Groves mechanism renders both ex ante and ex post efficiency. Levin and Smith
(1994) look at the symmetric mixed-strategy (strictly) entry equilibrium in a symmetric
setting with fixed entry costs. They find that the second-price auction with no entry
fee and a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation is both ex ante efficient and revenue-
maximizing for a private value case. Lu (2006) further shows that there is no loss of
generality in considering the entry patterns where every bidder participates with proba-
bility of either 0 or 1 for the revenue-maximizing (meanwhile ex ante efficient) auction.
As a result, while the above mentioned second-price auction remains ex ante efficient,
positive ex ante entry fees are generally necessary to extract the surplus of entrants for
revenue maximization. According to our findings, the efficiency of the above mentioned
2The setting of private-information discovery costs is also adopted by Rezende (2005).
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second price auction and the essentiality of ex ante entry fees for revenue maximization
also apply to the setting with private-information entry costs. Moreover, unlike the case
with fixed entry costs, the revenue-maximizing entry diverges from the ex ante efficient
entry when entry costs are private information. When bidders’ entry costs are fixed, the
revenue-maximizing entry coincides with the ex ante efficient entry, as the seller can use
ex ante entry fees to extract all the expected surplus of the entrants. However, when
the entry costs are private information of bidders, the seller can no longer do so. This
explains the discrepancy between the revenue-maximizing entry and the ex ante efficient
entry, and thus the revenue-maximizing auction must diverge from the ex ante efficient
auction.
We find that even for symmetric setting with private-information entry costs, the ex
ante efficient/revenue-maximizing entry could be asymmetric rather than symmetric. In
the following example, there are 2 potential bidders. Bidders’ private values follow a
uniform distribution on [0, 1], and bidders’ entry costs follow a uniform distribution on
[0.4, 0.5]. The seller’s valuation is 0. In this setting, the expected total surplus takes the
maximum of 0.05 when the participation thresholds of entry costs for the 2 bidders are
0.5 and 0.4, respectively; seller’s expected revenue takes the maximum of 0.025 when the
entry thresholds for the 2 bidders are 0.45 and 0.4, respectively. The intuition behind
the asymmetry in the ex ante efficient/revenue-maximizing entry lies in that the marginal
contribution of an additional entrant’s valuation to the expected total surplus/the seller’s
expected revenue strictly decreases with the number of other entrants. This implies that
given the sum of the ex ante participating probabilities of any two bidders, the marginal
contribution of their valuations to the total surplus/the seller’s revenue increases as their
ex ante participating probabilities diverges. Thus increasing the distance between the
entry thresholds of the bidders while maintaining the sum of their ex ante entry proba-
bilities must increase the total surplus/the seller’s revenue, provided that this adjustment
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in the entry thresholds does not substantially change the expected entry costs.3
Two interesting issues then arise. First, can we provide sufficient conditions for the
efficient/revenue-maximizing entry to be symmetric in a symmetric setting? Second, can
we provide sufficient conditions for the symmetric efficient/revenue-maximizing entry to
be the unique equilibrium of the proposed efficient/revenue-maximizing auction? Our
findings are the following. When the cumulative distribution function of the entry cost
changes rather slowly with respect to its argument, the efficient entry must be symmetric
across bidders and it is the unique entry equilibrium of the proposed efficient auction. If
the hazard rate of the entry cost distribution is additionally increasing, then the revenue-
maximizing entry must also be symmetric and it is the unique entry equilibrium of the
proposed revenue-maximizing auction. Therefore, large dispersion in the entry costs re-
stores the symmetry in the efficient/revenue-maximizing entry. This result is in contrast
to the existing findings of asymmetric efficient/revenue-maximizing entry in a setting with
commonly known costs or where the quality of the bidders’ information depends on their
investment. Bag (1996) shows that the efficient/revenue-maximizing investment decisions
can be asymmetric in a symmetric setting where the quality of the bidders’ information
quality depends on their investment. Lu (2006) in a setting with commonly known costs
shows that when there are sufficiently many bidders, the efficient/revenue-maximizing
entry must be an asymmetric one where every bidder participates with probability of 1
or 0.4
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider a general IPV setting
where potential bidders have different distributions on both valuations and valuation
discovery costs. The ex ante efficient auction and revenue-maximizing auction are estab-
lished. In Section 3, we focus on issues in the symmetric IPV setting, where potential
3This condition holds when the ranges of private entry costs are rather small, especially when entry
costs are fixed as in Lu (2006).
4Lu (2004) and Celik and Yilankaya (2005) find that asymmetric revenue-maximizing entry may also
arise in a symmetric setting where fixed entry costs are incurred by bidders who know their valuations.
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bidders share identical distributions on valuations and valuation discovery costs. We
show that the efficient/revenue-maximizing entry can be asymmetric. We further pro-
vide sufficient conditions for the efficient/revenue-maximizing entry to be symmetric and
for the symmetric entry to be the unique equilibrium of the proposed efficient/revenue-
maximizing auction. Section 4 concludes.
2 Auctions Design under General IPV Setting
There are N(≥ 2) potential bidders who are interested in a single item, where N is public
information. Denote this group of potential bidders by N = {1, 2, ..., N}. The seller’s
valuation is v0, which is public information. Bidder i has to incur an entry cost of ci in
order to enter the auction.5 After entry, he observes his private value vi. Both ci and vi
are assumed to be private information of bidder i. The cumulative distribution function
of ci is Gi(ci) with density function of gi(ci), while the cumulative distribution function
of vi is Fi(vi) with density function of fi(vi). The support of Gi(ci) is [ci, ci], and the
support of Fi(vi) is [vi, vi]. We assume gi(·) > 0 on its support. The distributions of ci and
vi, i ∈ N are assumed to be public information. The entry costs can be interpreted as the
bidders’ efficiency in discovering their valuations. In this paper, we study a setting where
the bidders’ valuations do not depend on their efficiency in discovering their valuations.
Specifically, we assume ci and vj, ∀i, j ∈ N are mutually independent. The seller and
bidders are assumed to be risk neutral. The timing of the auction is as follows.
Time 0: The group of potential bidders N , the seller’s valuation v0 and the distrib-
utions Fi(·), Gi(·), i ∈ N are revealed by Nature as public information. Every bidder i
observes his private cost ci, i ∈ N .
Time 1: The seller announces the rule of the auction. We assume that the seller has
5This assumption is widely adopted in the literature. However, this assumption precludes the possi-
bility that a bidder may simply submit a bid equal to the unconditional expected valuation.
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the power of committing to his announcement.
Time 2: The bidders simultaneously and confidentially make their entry decisions.
If they do not enter, they simply take the outside option which gives them zero payoff.
If they enter, they have to incur their private entry costs. If the seller announces an ex
ante entry fee for bidder i, he has to also pay this entry fee to the seller upon entry. All
entrants observe their private values after entry.
Time 3: All entrants bid.6 If no one participates, the game is over.
Time 4: The payoffs of the seller and all the participating bidders are determined
according to the announced rule at time 1.
We study the ex ante efficient auction rule and the revenue-maximizing auction rule
announced at time 1. Here, the ex ante efficient auction refers to the auction max-
imizing the expected total surplus of seller and bidders; and the revenue-maximizing
auction refers to the auction maximizing the expected revenue of the seller. We assume
that the seller can impose ex ante entry fees which the entrants must pay to the seller
before they observe their valuations. These ex ante entry fees differ from the entry fees
that the seller may impose for the bidding stage. In this paper, only the ex ante entry
fees are relevant.
Before we proceed to consider the auctions design, we first characterize all the feasible
equilibrium entry patterns.
Lemma 1: Any equilibrium entry pattern can be described through a vector of entry
thresholds Ce = (ce1, ..., ceN) satisfying the following properties: (i) cei ∈ [ci, ci], ∀i ∈ N ;
(ii) if ci < cei , bidder i participates with probability 1; if ci > cei , bidder i participates with
probability 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Given entry thresholds Ce where cei ∈ [ci, ci], ∀i ∈ N , we assume (i) if cei > ci, bidder
6Every entrant may or may not observe the other participants. The auctions designed later work in
both cases.
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i participates if and only if ci ≤ cei ; (ii) if cei = ci, no type of bidder i participates.
This simplification is reasonable, because if cei > ci bidder i with cost cei at least weakly
prefers participation, and if cei = ci then bidder i with cost cei at least weakly prefers
nonparticipation. Moreover, this simplification only further specifies the participation
of the threshold type cei . The expected total surplus and seller’s expected revenue are
not affected. For convenience, we define the following auction, which will be referred to
frequently hereafter.
Definition 1: We define A0 as the second-price auction with no entry fee and a reserve
price equal to the seller’s valuation v0.
Next, we establish the following results regarding the restricted ex ante efficient
auction/revenue-maximizing auction that implements given entry thresholds Ce = (ce1, ...,
ceN), where cei ∈ [ci, ci], ∀i ∈ N .
Proposition 1: (i) Among all auctions implementing any given entry thresholds Ce =
(ce1, ..., ceN), a second-price auction with a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation and
appropriate ex ante entry fee (or subsidy) for every bidder provides the highest seller’s
expected revenue as well as the highest expected total surplus. (ii) The ex ante entry fees
(or subsidies) are charged upon entry before the valuations are learned by the entrants,
and are set at levels such that the threshold-type entrants get zero expected payoff. (iii)
In the above auction, the expected surplus of bidder i with entry cost ci(< cei ) is cei − ci.
Proof: See Appendix.
For given entry thresholds Ce where cei ∈ [ci, ci], ∀i ∈ N , we denote the highest
expected total surplus and the highest seller’s expected revenue attainable through the
Proposition 1 auction by S(Ce) and R(Ce), respectively. We next introduce a convenient
way of writing S(Ce) and R(Ce).
We define set K = {(k1, k2, ..., kN)|ki ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N}, where ki denotes bidder i’s
ex post entry status. Specifically, ki = 1 stands for the participation of bidder i, while
ki = 0 represents the non-participation of bidder i. In addition, k0 ≡ 1 symbolizes the
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participation of the seller. For any k = (k1, k2, ..., kN) ∈ K, use vk to denote the highest
valuation of all ex post participants including the seller. Then vk can be written as
vk = max{kj=1,0≤j≤N}{vj}. We use fk(vk) and Fk(vk) to denote the density and cumulative
distribution function of vk, respectively. Furthermore, we use Vk to denote the expectation
of vk. According to Proposition 1, S(Ce) and R(Ce) can be written as the following
S(Ce) =
( ∑
{k∈K}
VkPr(k)
)
−
∑
i∈N
∫ cei
ci
cigi(ci)dci, (1)
R(Ce) =
( ∑
{k∈K}
VkPr(k)
)
−
∑
i∈N
ceiGi(cei ), (2)
where Pr(k) = ∏i∈N (Gi(cei ))ki(1−Gi(cei ))1−ki is the ex ante probability that the ex post
participation status denoted by k happens. The term ∑{k∈K} VkPr(k) is the ex ante
expected contribution of the valuations of all players including the seller to the expected
total surplus if potential bidders participate according to threshold-vector Ce. The term
∑
i∈N
∫ cei
ci
cigi(ci)dci is the ex ante expected contribution (negative) of the entry costs of
bidders to the expected total surplus if the potential bidders participate according to
thresholds Ce. The difference between these two terms is then the expected total surplus
S(Ce). Following Proposition 1(iii), we know that the ex ante expected information rents
of bidder i is
∫ cei
ci
(cei − ci)gi(ci)dci. This leads to the seller’s expected revenue R(Ce) in
(2), which is the difference between the expected total surplus S(Ce) and all the bidders’
ex ante expected information rents
∑
i∈N
∫ cei
ci
(cei − ci)gi(ci)dci.
2.1 Ex Ante Efficient Auction
We derive the ex ante efficient auction through two steps. First, we characterize the first
order conditions for the ex ante efficient thresholds Ce∗ = (ce∗1 , ..., ce∗N ), which maximize
S(Ce). Second, we show that auction A0 implements Ce∗ and achieves S(Ce∗).
First, we characterize the first order conditions for the efficient threshold-vector Ce∗ =
(ce∗1 , ..., ce∗N ) that maximizes S(Ce). Let us consider the entry threshold ce∗i for bidder
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i, ∀i ∈ N . Define K−i = {(k1, ..., ki−1, ki+1, ..., kN)|kj ∈ {0, 1}, j 6= i.}, ∀i ∈ N . For
any k−i = (k1, ..., ki−1, ki+1, ..., kN) ∈ K−i, we use k1(k−i) to denote the N -element vector
where the i-th element is 1 and other elements are same with k−i, while we use k0(k−i)
to denote the N -element vector where the i-th element is 0 and other elements are same
with k−i. We then have
S(Ce) =
∑
{k−i∈K−i}
Pr(k−i)[Gi(cei )Vk1(k−i) + (1−Gi(cei ))Vk0(k−i)]−
∑
i∈N
∫ cei
ci
cigi(ci)dci,
where Pr(k−i) =
∏
j 6=iGj(cej)kj(1−Gj(cej))1−kj is the ex ante probability that the ex post
participation status denoted by k−i happens. This leads to
∂S(Ce)
∂cei
= gi(cei )
∑
{k−i∈K−i}
[(Vk1(k−i) − Vk0(k−i)−cei )Pr(k−i)], (3)
as
∑
{k−i∈K−i} Pr(k−i) = 1.
Since Ce∗ maximizes S(Ce), then we must have the following characterization for Ce∗.
For all i ∈ N ,
∂S(Ce∗)
∂cei
=



0, if ce∗i ∈ (ci, ci),
≥ 0, if ce∗i = ci,
≤ 0, if ce∗i = ci.
(4)
Clearly, (4) are only the necessary conditions for the efficient entry. In Section 3.3, we
will provide sufficient conditions characterizing the efficient entry in a symmetric setting.
Define Si(Ce) =
∑
{k−i∈K−i}[(Vk1(k−i) − Vk0(k−i)−cei )Pr(k−i)]. This term on the right
hand side of (3) is the marginal contribution of bidder i with entry cost cei to the expected
total surplus, given that other bidders participate in auction A0 according to Ce. Before
we move forward, we first show the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: Vk1(k−i) − Vk0(k−i) is the expected payoff of bidder i with zero entry cost from
participating in auction A0, if all other participants are those bidders with kj = 1 in vector
k−i.
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Proof: See Appendix.
It then follows from Lemma 2 that Si(Ce) is the expected payoff of bidder i with
cost cei when he participates in auction A0, when all other potential bidders participate
according to Ce. This insight, together with (3) and (4), leads to the following proposition
which addresses the ex ante efficient auction.
Proposition 2: The second-price auction A0 is ex ante efficient.
Proof: Since gi(·) > 0, it is clearly a Nash equilibrium that every bidder participates in
auction A0 according to Ce∗, as (4) is satisfied for Ce∗. In addition, A0 clearly renders
an expected total surplus of S(Ce∗). 2
Proposition 2 shows that A0 is ex ante efficient in a more general environment than the
fixed costs settings of Levin and Smith (1994) and Lu (2006). Proposition 2 accommodates
the flexibility of corner solutions, as indicated by (4). An example of corner solution is
provided in the following symmetric setting, where v0 = 0, N = 2, Fi(vi) = vi, ∀vi ∈ [0, 1],
and Gi(ci) = 10(ci − 0.4), ∀ci ∈ [0.4, 0.5]. In this setting, S(Ce) takes the maximum of
0.05 when ce1 = 0.5 and ce2 = 0.4. This means that one bidder always participates, while
the other one never participates.
In addition, in the above example there exists another symmetric entry equilibrium
where ce1 = ce2 = 0.4231 for A0. Thus, an issue of multiplicity of entry equilibria for the
efficient auction A0 arises. The multiplicity of entry equilibria means that A0 can be
efficient or not depending on the entry equilibrium the bidders play. In Section 3.3, we
will address this issue in a symmetric setting.
The following Corollary further discusses the uniqueness of ex ante entry fees that
implement the efficient entry Ce∗ in a second price auction with a reserve price equal to
the seller’s valuation.
Corollary 1: Suppose Ce∗ is the efficient entry to be implemented. (i) A zero entry fee
for every bidder implements Ce∗. (ii) If ce∗i ∈ (ci, ci), then the ex ante entry fee for bidder
i cannot be other than zero. (iii) If ce∗i = ci, the ex ante entry fee for bidder i can be set
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at any level which is smaller than or equal to Si(Ce∗) which is nonnegative. No other ex
ante entry fees works. (iv) If ce∗i = ci, the ex ante entry fee for bidder i can be set at
any level which is greater than or equal to Si(Ce∗) which is nonpositive. No other ex ante
entry fees works.
Proof: See Appendix.
2.2 Revenue-Maximizing Auction
We now study the revenue-maximizing auction. From (1), (2) and (3), we have
∂R(Ce)
∂cei
= gi(cei )[Si(Ce)−
Gi(cei )
gi(cei )
], ∀i ∈ N . (5)
Suppose that Ce† = (ce†1 , ..., c
e†
N ) maximizes R(Ce), then we have the following charac-
terization for Ce†. For all i ∈ N ,
∂R(Ce†)
∂cei
=



0, if ce†i ∈ (ci, ci),
≥ 0, if ce†i = ci,
≤ 0, if ce†i = ci.
(6)
Clearly, (6) are only the necessary conditions for the revenue-maximizing entry. In Section
3.3, we will provide sufficient conditions characterizing the revenue-maximizing entry in
a symmetric setting.
Define Ri(Ce) = Si(Ce) − Gi(c
e
i )
gi(cei )
. Based on Lemma 2, we have that Ri(Ce†) is the
expected payoff of bidder i with cost cei , if he participates in a second-price auction with
a reserve price equal to v0 and an ex ante entry fee of Gi(c
e
i )
gi(cei )
for bidder i, provided that all
other potential bidders participate according to Ce†.7 Based on this insight, we obtain
from (5) and (6) the following proposition that addresses the revenue-maximizing auction.
Proposition 3: Suppose that Ce† maximizes R(Ce), then a second-price auction with
reserve price equal to seller’s valuation and ex ante entry fees Ei for bidder i defined
7As pointed out in Proposition 1, the ex ante entry fees are charged before the valuations are learned
by the entrants.
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below leads to the seller the highest expected revenue. The entrants pay their ex ante entry
fees before their valuations are learned. The ex ante entry fees Ei, i ∈ N are defined as
Ei =



Si(Ce†) = Gi(c
e†
i )
gi(ce†i )
, if ce†i ∈ (ci, ci),
Si(Ce†) ≥ 1gi(ci) , if c
e†
i = ci,
any number ≥ Si(Ce†)(≤ 0), if ce†i = ci.
(7)
Proof: Since gi(·) > 0, it is clearly a Nash equilibrium that every bidder participates in
the above defined auction according to Ce†, while (6) and (7) hold.
From Proposition 1(ii), if ce†i > ci, the entry fees should be set at the levels such that
the threshold types get zero expected payoff. Therefore, Ei should be Si(Ce†) if ce†i > ci.
From (5) and (6), Si(Ce†) = Gi(c
e†
i )
gi(ce†i )
if ce†i ∈ (ci, ci), and Si(Ce†) ≥ 1gi(ce†i )
if ce†i = ci.
If ce†i = ci, any entry fee which is bigger than Si(Ce†)(≤ 0) implements the threshold
participation. 2
From Proposition 3, if the entry cost is private information of bidders, then essentially
the revenue-maximizing auction involves positive individual ex ante entry fees unless
cei = ci, ∀i ∈ N . When cei = ci, ∀i ∈ N , we have a degenerate case where it is inefficient
for any bidder to participate in any chance, i.e.,
∫ vi
v0 (vi − v0)fi(vi)dvi ≤ ci, ∀i ∈ N .
Similar to the case of efficient auction, there may exist multiple entry equilibria for
the revenue-efficient auction of Proposition 3. The multiplicity of entry equilibria means
that the Proposition 3 auction can be revenue-maximizing or not depending on the entry
equilibrium the bidders play. In Section 3.3, we will address this issue in a symmetric
setting.
The following Corollary further discusses the uniqueness of the revenue-maximizing
ex ante entry fees that implement the entry Ce† in a second price auction with a reserve
price equal to the seller’s valuation.
Corollary 2: Suppose Ce† is the revenue-maximizing entry to be implemented. (i) If
ce†i ∈ (ci, ci), then the ex ante revenue-maximizing entry fee for bidder i cannot be other
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than Gi(c
e†
i )
gi(ce†i )
. (ii) If ce†i = ci, the revenue-maximizing ex ante entry fee for bidder i must
equal Si(Ce†) which is higher than 1gi(ce†i )
. (iii) If ce†i = ci, the revenue-maximizing ex ante
entry fee for bidder i can be set at any level which is greater than or equal to Si(Ce†)
which is nonpositive. No other ex ante entry fees works.
Proof: See Appendix.
Based on Corollary 2, we further emphasize the following properties of the ex ante
entry fees in the revenue-maximizing auctions.
Corollary 3: (i) There is no loss of generality to consider only nonnegative ex ante entry
fees for the revenue-maximizing auction. (ii) The ex ante entry fees for any entrant in
the revenue-maximizing auction must be positive.
Conditions (4) and (6) mean that if the entry costs are private information of the
bidders, then the ex ante efficient entry generally differs from the revenue-maximizing
entry. In contrast, when the entry costs are fixed, the ex ante efficient entry is also revenue-
maximizing, although the ex ante entry fees can differ across the ex ante efficient auction
and the revenue-maximizing auction. The intuition behind this contrast is as follows. If
the entry costs are fixed, the seller can always extract all the expected surplus of the
participants. Thus the entry pattern maximizing expected total surplus also maximizes
the seller’s expected revenue. However, if the entry costs are private information of the
bidders, then the seller has no way to extract all the surplus of the participants according
to Proposition 1(iii). This leads to the discrepancy between the ex ante efficient entry and
the revenue-maximizing entry when entry costs are private information of the bidders. It
follows that the revenue-maximizing auction must generally be different from the ex ante
efficient auction.
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3 Further Issues in Symmetric IPV Setting
In Section 2, we consider the unrestricted ex ante efficient and revenue-maximizing auc-
tions in a general IPV setting. In this section, we further study some special issues for a
symmetric setting where the distributions of the bidders’ valuations and entry costs are
the same across all potential bidders. The common cumulative distribution function of
all ci, i ∈ N is G(·) with density function of g(·). The common cumulative distribution
function of all vi, i ∈ N is F (·) with density function of f(·). The support of G(·) is [c, c],
and the support of F (·) is [v, v]. We assume v0 < v and g(·) > 0 on its support.
Clearly, all the findings in Section 2 apply to the above specified symmetric IPV
setting. In this section, we investigate some special issues which are unique to the above
symmetric setting. We first establish the efficient and revenue-maximizing auctions within
the symmetric-entry class. We then show that even for the symmetric setting, the ex
ante efficient/revenue-maximizing entry can be asymmetric, i.e., the desired participation
thresholds are different across bidders. To address the issues of multiplicity of entry
equilibria and the optimality of asymmetric entry, we further establish general sufficient
conditions for the optimality and uniqueness of symmetric entry. According to our results,
the more dispersed the distribution of the entry costs, the more likely we have symmetric
efficient and revenue-maximizing entries. These results justify the conventional wisdom
of looking at only the symmetric entries for efficient/revenue-maximizing auction.
3.1 Efficient and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions in Symmetric-
Entry Class
Symmetric entry across bidders implies that the thresholds cei are same across all potential
bidders. Suppose cei = ce ∈ [c, c], ∀i ∈ N . We define Ss(ce) = S(Ces) and Rs(ce) = R(Ces),
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where Ces = (ce, ..., ce). With this restriction, we have
dSs(ce)
dce =
∑
{i∈N}
∂S(Ces)
∂cei
= N ∂S(C
e
s)
∂cei
, ∀i ∈ N , (8)
dRs(ce)
dce
=
∑
{i∈N}
∂R(Ces)
∂cei
= N ∂R(C
e
s)
∂cei
, ∀i ∈ N . (9)
(8) and (9) lead to
∂S(Ces)
∂cei
=
dSs(ce)
dce
/N, ∀i ∈ N , (10)
∂R(Ces)
∂cei
=
dRs(ce)
dce /N, ∀i ∈ N . (11)
Suppose that ce∗ maximizes Ss(ce) and ce† maximizes Rs(ce). Define Ce∗s = (ce∗, ..., ce∗)
and Ce†s = (ce†, ..., ce†). Then we have the following characterizations for ce∗ and ce† from
(10) and (11). For all i ∈ N ,
Si(Ce∗s ) =
∂S(Ce∗s )
∂cei
/g(ce∗) =



0, if ce∗ ∈ (c, c),
≥ 0, if ce∗ = c,
≤ 0, if ce∗ = c,
(12)
and
Ri(Ce†s ) =
∂R(Ce†s )
∂cei
/g(ce†) =



0, if ce† ∈ (c, c),
≥ 0, if ce† = c,
≤ 0, if ce† = c.
(13)
Si(Ce∗s ) is the expected payoff of bidder i with cost ce∗ when he participates in auction
A0 if all other potential bidders participate according to threshold ce∗. Ri(Ce†s ) is the
expected payoff of bidder i with cost ce† when he participates in a second price auction
with an ex ante entry fee of G(c
e†)
g(ce†) and a reserve price equal to v0, if all other potential
bidders participate according to threshold ce†. Thus, (12) and (13) lead to the following
results. The proofs are similar to those of Propositions 2 and 3 and thus omitted.
16
Proposition 4: (i) In a symmetric IPV setting with private-information entry costs for
bidders, the second-price auction A0 is ex ante efficient in the symmetric-entry class.
(ii) Suppose ce† maximizes Rs(ce), then a second-price auction with a reserve price equal
to seller’s valuation and an ex ante entry fee, E, defined below maximizes the seller’s
expected revenue in the symmetric-entry class. The ex ante entry fee, E, is defined as
E =



Si(Ce†s ) =
G(ce†)
g(ce†) , if c
e† ∈ (c, c),
Si(Ce†s ) ≥ 1g(c) , if c
e† = c,
any number ≥ Si(Ce†s )(≤ 0), if ce† = c.
(14)
From (12) and (13), Ce∗s and Ce†s must be at least locally efficient and revenue-
maximizing, respectively. In Section 3.3, we will provide sufficient conditions for them to
be globally efficient and revenue-maximizing, respectively. Furthermore, in our analysis
above only symmetric entry equilibria are in the feasible set. However, there may exist
multiple entry equilibria for the Proposition 4 auctions as pointed out in Sections 2.1 and
2.2. The multiplicity of entry equilibria means that the Proposition 4 auctions can be
efficient/revenue-maximizing or not depending on the entry equilibrium the bidders play.
This issue of multiplicity of entry equilibria will be partially sorted out later in Section
3.3.
Proposition 4 shows that restricting the entry to be symmetric across bidders does not
change the main ideas of Propositions 2 and 3. Similar to Corollaries 1 and 2, the unique-
ness of the ex ante entry fee schedule which implements the ex ante efficient/revenue-
maximizing entry can be discussed.
3.2 Asymmetry in the Efficient/Revenue-Maximizing Entry
Consider a symmetric setting where v0 = 0, N = 2, F (v) = v, ∀v ∈ [0, 1], and
G(c) = 10(c − 0.4), ∀c ∈ [0.4, 0.5]. Direct calculations using (1) and (2) give the fol-
lowing results. S(Ce) takes the maximum of 0.05 when ce1 = 0.5 and ce2 = 0.4, and
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R(Ce) takes the maximum of 0.025 when ce1 = 0.45 and ce2 = 0.4. If we restrict ce1 = ce2,
then we have S(Ce) takes the maximum of 0.023 when ce1 = ce2 = 0.4231, and R(Ce)
takes the maximum of 0.01875 when ce1 = ce2 = 0.4187. In other words, the ex ante
efficient/revenue-maximizing entry is asymmetric. This example indicates that “symmet-
ric” entry is generally restrictive for auctions design.
Define Wn as the expectation of the highest valuation of the seller and n(≥ 0) sym-
metric bidders. The following Lemma provides some properties of the series Wn, n ≥ 0.
Lemma 3: Both Wn −Wn−1 and (Wn+1 −Wn)− (Wn+2 −Wn+1) decrease with n(≥ 0).
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuitions behind the asymmetry of the efficient/revenue-maximizing entry are as
follows. Let us consider the case with 2 potential bidders (N=2). From (1) and (2), the
first common component of S(ce1, ce2) and R(ce1, ce2) can be written as
W2
2∏
i=1
G(cei ) +W1[G(ce1)(1−G(ce2)) +G(ce2)(1−G(ce1))] +W0
2∏
i=1
(1−G(cei ))
= (W1 −W0)
2∑
i=1
G(cei ) +
(W2 −W1)− (W1 −W0)
4
[(
2∑
i=1
G(cei ))2 − (G(ce1)−G(ce2))2].
From Lemma 3, W2 −W1 < W1 −W0 as Wn+1 −Wn (the contribution of the valuation
of an additional bidder if there are already n bidders) decreases with n. Thus for given
∑2
i=1G(cei ), we want to maximize G(ce1) − G(ce2) in order to maximize the above com-
mon component of S(ce1, ce2) and R(ce1, ce2). Therefore, if the symmetric entry threshold
maximizing the above common component is an inner solution, we must have that the
unrestricted solution must be asymmetric. The above arguments can be generalized to
the case where N > 2 by focusing on the entries of any two bidders while assuming the
entry thresholds of all other bidders are fixed.
It is clear that if c and c are close enough, increasing the difference between the entry
thresholds of any 2 bidders while keeping the sum of their ex ante entry probabilities
unchanged will lead to higher expected total surplus/the seller’s expected revenue because
the second terms in (1) and (2) do not change much.
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3.3 Optimality and Uniqueness of Symmetric Entry
In a symmetric setting, for the proposed efficient auction A0, there may exist multiple
entry equilibria. In the Section 3.2 example, the unrestricted efficient entry thresholds
are ce1 = 0.5 and ce2 = 0.4, while the symmetric efficient thresholds are ce1 = ce2 = 0.4231.
According to Propositions 2 and 4, both of these two entry patterns are implemented
through the same second price auction A0.
In the same example, the unrestricted revenue-maximizing entry thresholds are ce1 =
0.45 and ce2 = 0.4, while the symmetric revenue-maximizing thresholds are ce1 = ce2 =
0.4187. In Propositions 3 and 4, two different auctions are proposed to implement these
two different entry patterns. Nevertheless, for the Proposition 4(ii) auction, there may
exist multiple entry equilibria, just like the case of the efficient auction A0.
To address the issues of multiplicity of entry equilibria and optimality of the symmetric
entry, we present the following results.
Proposition 5: If G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) , ∀c1, c2, then there exists a unique entry
equilibrium for each of the Proposition 4 auctions. These entry equilibria are symmetric
across bidders.
Proof: See Appendix.
Since G(·) belongs to [0, 1], the condition G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) can easily be
satisfied if the distribution of the entry costs is quite dispersed. A sufficient condition
for G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) is g(·) <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) . Therefore, if the entry
costs follow a uniform distribution, then the bigger the range of the entry costs, the less
likely there exist asymmetric equilibria. In this sense, greater dispersion of entry costs
decreases the likelihood of asymmetric entry equilibria. In the Section 3.2 example where
asymmetric entries emerge for auction A0, the range of the entry costs is rather small.
As a result, the condition in Proposition 5 is violated.
The efficient entry is always implemented through A0 according to Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 further provides sufficient condition for A0 to implement a unique entry
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equilibrium, which is symmetric. We thus have the following results.
Corollary 4: If G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) , ∀c1, c2, then the following results hold.
(i) The ex ante efficient entry must be symmetric. (ii) This ex ante efficient entry is the
unique entry equilibrium of the efficient auction A0. (iii) The efficient entry threshold is
fully characterized through (12).
The following proposition further presents sufficient conditions for the revenue-maximizing
entry to be symmetric.
Proposition 6: If G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) , ∀c1, c2 and the hazard rate
G(·)
g(·) in-
creases, then the revenue-maximizing entry must be symmetric.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 6 provides sufficient conditions for the revenue-maximizing entry to be
symmetric. According to Proposition 4, this symmetric revenue-maximizing entry is im-
plemented through the Proposition 4(ii) auction. Proposition 5 further provides sufficient
condition for the Proposition 4(ii) auction to implement a unique entry equilibrium, which
is symmetric. We thus have the results in Corollary 5.
Corollary 5: If G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) , ∀c1, c2 and the hazard rate
G(·)
g(·) increases,
then the following results hold. (i) The unique entry equilibrium of the Proposition 4(ii)
auction is globally revenue-maximizing. (ii) The globally revenue-maximizing threshold is
symmetric and fully characterized by (13).
4 Conclusion
This paper extends the pre-bid R&D and auctions design literature to an independent
private value (IPV) setting where each bidder has a valuation discovery cost that is his
private information. This framework allows asymmetry across bidders in the distributions
of their entry costs and private valuations. Unlike the case of fixed costs, bidders enjoy
information rents when entry costs are their private information. Due to these information
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rents, discrepancy appears between the ex ante efficient entry and the revenue-maximizing
entry. This further leads to the divergence between the ex ante efficient auction and the
revenue-maximizing auction. The ex ante efficiency is implemented through a second-
price auction with no entry fee and a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation. However,
the revenue-maximizing auction generally involves positive individual ex ante entry fees
for bidders. The revenue-maximizing ex ante entry fee for each bidder equals the hazard
rate of his entry cost distribution, evaluated at the corresponding revenue-maximizing
entry threshold for him.
These findings hold when we restrict the entries to be symmetric across symmetric
bidders. We find that even for a symmetric setting with private-information entry costs,
the ex ante efficient/revenue-maximizing entry can be asymmetric. The possibility of
asymmetric optima arises due to the fact that the marginal contribution of an additional
entrant’s valuation to the expected total surplus/the seller’s expected revenue strictly
decreases with the number of other entrants. Nevertheless, when the cumulative distri-
bution function of the entry costs changes rather slowly with respect to its argument,
the efficient entry must be symmetric across bidders and it is the unique entry equilib-
rium of the proposed efficient auction. If the hazard rate of the entry cost distribution is
additionally increasing, then the revenue-maximizing entry must also be symmetric and
it is the unique entry equilibrium of the proposed revenue-maximizing auction. These
results mean that the more dispersed the entry costs distribution, the more likely the
efficient/revenue-maximizing entry is symmetric. In other words, large dispersion in the
entry costs restores the symmetry in the efficient/revenue-maximizing entry.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let us consider any entry equilibrium E implemented by an auction rule.
If all bidders other than i adopt their equilibrium entry strategy described by E , the bidder i’s
equilibrium entry strategy in E must be his best entry strategy. Given that all bidders other
than i adopt the equilibrium entry strategy in E , there must exist an entry threshold cei ∈ [ci, ci]
such that bidder i’s best entry strategy is described by property (ii) in Lemma 1. This is true
because the expected payoff of bidder i from participating in any given auction decreases strictly
and continuously with his entry cost, given that all bidders other than i adopt their equilibrium
entry strategy in E . 2
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us first consider auction A0. Suppose all bidders other than i
participate in auction A0 according to thresholds Ce = (ce1, ..., ceN ). Denote bidder i’s expected
surplus by Si(ci;Ce) if he participates in A0 while his entry cost is ci. Then Si(ci;Ce) decreases
strictly and continuously with ci. Set an ex ante entry fee (or subsidy) for bidder i as Ei =
Si(cei ;Ce), ∀i ∈ N . Clearly, for a second-price auction with ex ante entry fee (or subsidy) Ei
for bidder i and a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation, bidder i’s expected payoff is cei − ci
if he participates and his entry cost is ci. Hence, the above auction with ex ante entry fee Ei
for bidder i implements entry thresholds Ce. Note that for any auction implementing entry
thresholds Ce, the total expected entry costs are the same. Thus the above designed auction
achieves the highest possible expected total surplus among the class of auctions implementing
Ce, as the auction always awards the item to the participant (including the seller) with the
highest valuation.
Moreover, for any auction implementing entry thresholds Ce, the expected surplus of bidder
i with entry cost ci ≤ cei can not be smaller than cei − ci, if he participates. This is due to the
fact that a type ci can always mimic a type cei , and by doing so he gets at least a payoff of
cei − ci. Recall that in a second-price auction with ex ante entry fee Ei for bidder i and a reserve
price equal to seller’s valuation, bidder i’s expected surplus is exactly cei − ci if he participates
and his entry cost is ci. As a result, this auction achieves the highest possible seller’s expected
revenue among all auctions implementing any given entry threshold-vector Ce. 2
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Proof of Lemma 2: This can be seen from the following arguments. Note that the economic
meaning of Vk1(k−i) − Vk0(k−i) is the marginal contribution of bidder i with zero entry cost to
the expected total surplus if he participates in auction A0, and all other participants are those
bidders with kj = 1, j 6= i in vector k−i. Hence, Vk1(k−i)− Vk0(k−i) can be alternatively written
as
Vk1(k−i) − Vk0(k−i) =
∫ vi
v0
{(vi − v0)Fk0(k−i)(v0) +
∫ vi
v0
(vi − v)fk0(k−i)(v)dv}fi(vi)dvi, (A.1)
where Fk0(k−i)(·) and fk0(k−i)(·) are the cumulative distribution function and density function of
vk0(k−i), respectively. In addition, note that the right hand side of (A.1) can also be interpreted
as the expected payoff of bidder i with zero entry cost when he participates in auction A0, if all
other participants are those bidders with kj = 1 in vector k−i. 2
Proof of Corollary 1: First, from (3) and (4), the ex ante entry fees of Corollary 1 implement
the efficient entryCe∗ in a second price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller’s valuation.
Second, if the ax ante entry fees are defined differently from those specified in Corollary 1, then
it is clear that the entry threshold ce∗i can not be implemented. 2
Proof of Corollary 2: First, from the proof of Proposition 3, the ex ante entry fees of Corollary
2 implement the efficient entry Ce† and extract all the expected surplus of the threshold types
in a second price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller’s valuation. Second, if the ex
ante entry fees are defined differently from those specified in Corollary 2, then it is clear that
either the entry threshold ce†i can not be implemented or the surplus of the threshold types can
not be extracted completely. 2
Proof of Lemma 3: We use Hn(·) to denote the cumulative distribution function of the
highest valuation of the seller and n(≥ 0) symmetric bidders. Then Hn(·) = F n(·) on its
support [v0, v], ∀n ≥ 1. Without loss of generality, we assume v0 ∈ (v, v). Hn(·) has a mass
point at v0. It follows that Wn = v0F n(v0) +
∫ v
v0 xdF
n(x) = v −
∫ v
v0 F
n(x)dx, ∀n ≥ 0. This
leads to that Wn − Wn−1 =
∫ v
v0(1 − F (x))F
n−1(x)dx and (Wn − Wn−1) − (Wn+1 − Wn) =
∫ v
v0(1 − F (x))
2F n−1(x)dx, ∀n ≥ 1. Therefore, we have both Wn+1 −Wn and (Wn+1 −Wn) −
(Wn+2 −Wn+1) decrease with n(≥ 0). 2
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Proof of Proposition 5: We prove the proposition using contradiction. Note that a symmetric
entry equilibrium always exists. Suppose that there is another asymmetric entry equilibriumCe.
Then, we can find i1, i2 ∈ N such that cei1 > c
e
i2 . We use Pr(n), n = 0, 1, ..., N − 2 to denote
the probabilities with which there are n bidders from the other N − 2 bidders participating
in the auction. According to Lemma 3, Wn+1 −Wn is the expected payoff of a bidder from
participating in auction A0, if his entry cost is zero and there are other n participants.
Since entry thresholds cei1 , c
e
i2 can be corner solutions, we must have that
N−2∑
n=0
Pr(n){(1−G(cei2))(Wn+1 −Wn) +G(c
e
i2)(Wn+2 −Wn+1)} ≥ c
e
i1 +E, (A.2)
N−2∑
n=0
Pr(n){(1−G(cei1))(Wn+1 −Wn) +G(c
e
i1)(Wn+2 −Wn+1)} ≤ c
e
i2 +E, (A.3)
where E is the ex ante entry fee in the Proposition 4(i) or 4(ii) auction. (A.2) and (A.3) lead
to
(G(cei1 )−G(c
e
i2))
N−2∑
n=0
Pr(n)[(Wn+1 −Wn)− (Wn+2 −Wn+1)] ≥ cei1 − c
e
i2 . (A.4)
From Lemma 3, we have
∑N−2
n=0 Pr(n)[(Wn+1 −Wn) − (Wn+2 −Wn+1)] ≤ (W1 −W0) − (W2 −
W1). As G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) , ∀c1, c2, we have the left hand side of (A.4) must be
smaller than cei1 − c
e
i2 . This contradicts with (A.4). Therefore, there exists no asymmetric entry
equilibrium for the Proposition 4 auctions. 2
Proof of Proposition 6: We prove the proposition using contradiction. Suppose that the
revenue-maximizing entry Ce is asymmetric. Then, we can find i1, i2 ∈ N such that cei1 > c
e
i2 .
We use Pr(n), n = 0, 1, ..., N − 2 to denote the probabilities with which there are n bidders
from the other N − 2 bidders participating in the auction.
Since entry thresholds cei1 , c
e
i2 can be corner solutions, Proposition 3 gives
N−2∑
n=0
Pr(n){(1−G(cei2))(Wn+1 −Wn) +G(c
e
i2)(Wn+2 −Wn+1)} ≥ c
e
i1 +
G(cei1)
g(cei1)
, (A.5)
N−2∑
n=0
Pr(n){(1−G(cei2))(Wn+1 −Wn) +G(c
e
i2)(Wn+2 −Wn+1)} ≤ c
e
i2 +
G(cei2)
g(cei2)
. (A.6)
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(A.5) and (A.6) lead to
(G(cei1 )−G(c
e
i2))
N−2∑
n=0
Pr(n)[(Wn+1 −Wn)− (Wn+2 −Wn+1)]
≥ (cei1 − c
e
i2) + (
G(cei1 )
g(cei1 )
−
G(cei2)
g(cei2 )
) ≥ cei1 − c
e
i2 , (A.7)
as hazard rate G(·)g(·) increases. From Lemma 3, we have
∑N−2
n=0 Pr(n)[(Wn+1 −Wn) − (Wn+2 −
Wn+1)] ≤ (W1−W0)− (W2−W1). As G(c1)−G(c2)c1−c2 <
1
(W1−W0)−(W2−W1) , ∀c1, c2, we have the left
hand side of (A.7) must be smaller than cei1 − c
e
i2 . This contradicts with (A.7). Therefore, the
revenue-maximizing entry must be symmetric. 2
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